Pondering the Scope of Premises Search Warrants after Ybarra v. Illinois by Winter, Jeffrey D.
Pondering the Scope of Premises Search
Warrants After Ybarra v. Illinois*
The problem of isolating the person from the place in a premise
search has always been vexing. The Supreme Court has rejected
the notion that people are safe from searches only in certain "con-
stitutionally protected areas,"' and has advanced to the doctrine
of "reasonable expectation of privacy." Some cases have added a
new twist to this theory by considering the expectation of privacy
and probable cause to search in terms of a person's relationship to
the place being searched.
This Comment will attempt to analyze these cases in the frame-
work provided by the United States Supreme Court in Ybarra v.
Illinois. Although some of these cases appear to contradict
Ybarra, their holdings are, in fact, consistent with it and serve to
further define the permissible scope of searches. This Comment
will suggest that a premises search warrant for a workplace in-
cludes within its scope the belongings of the people employed
there.
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the law has accorded office searches and seizures va-
rying treatment. This is due, in part, to a conflict between the idea
that the workplace is less private than the home, so one's expectation
of privacy is less there than in the home, and the intuitive appeal of
the argument that one's fourth amendment rights3 apply at the
* The student writer gratefully acknowledges the guidance and assistance provided
by Professor Phillip L.B. Halpern.
1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
2. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
3. The fourth amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
workplace as well as at the home. This is especially true where the
searches have been conducted pursuant to premises search warrants.
In 1979, in Ybarra v. Illinois,4 the United States Supreme Court
held that a search warrant authorizing a search of a bar's premises
and the bartender's person did not permit the police to search the
bar's patrons.5 This decision seemed to reinforce the argument ad-
vanced in Katz v. United States" that "the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people, not places."'7 And yet, the scope of Ybarra remains
unsettled.
In fact, with increasing law enforcement against economic or
"white collar" crime, the place--especially the workplace-poses
some significant problems. First, even small corporations typically
have quite a few employees working for them. This creates an imme-
diate problem because the authorities must exercise some control
over these people to prevent disruption of the search and loss of evi-
dence. Second, evidence of white collar crime can often be concealed
easily. Papers, cassette tapes, or computer records containing evi-
dence of crime can easily be pocketed or put in someone's purse or
briefcase, thus thwarting the search if that person is not named in
the warrant. Moreover, it is not easy to predict who, within the cor-
poration, actually has the evidence. Depending on the crime, any
number of people-from the highest executive to any lower level em-
ployee-may exercise some control over the relevant documents. In
these cases it is often impossible to identify initially any one person
against whom the government can assert a "particularized" probable
cause.8 Therefore, it would be unrealistic to require the government
to anticipate and name, in advance, all persons it wishes to search.
How far did the Court intend to go with Ybarra? Consider the
following situation: Government authorities have obtained a warrant
to search a corporation's premises. They have probable cause to be-
lieve certain documents providing evidence of fraud are on the prem-
ises. Once the authorities arrive on the premises, to what extent is
their search limited by Ybarra? May they search an employee not
named in the warrant? If so, may the search include the employee's
briefcase? A pat down of the employee's person?
A literal interpretation of Ybarra would mean the government
may only search those persons named in the warrant. Such a ruling,
however, would severely restrict white collar investigations, and does
not consider the practicalities of conducting a corporate search. Re-
4. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
5. id.
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. Id. at 351.
8. See A. REISS & A. BIDERMAN, DATA SOURCES ON WHITE-COLLAR LAW-
BREAKING 352 (1980).
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cent decisions in lower courts, particularly in the Ninth Circuit,
seem to indicate that Ybarra may not have the expansive influence
previously believed.' Should Ybarra stand as a precedential model
for the permissible corporate search, or should it be limited to its
facts?
This Comment will analyze the permissible scope of searches in
two respects: first, the conditions under which a premises search war-
rant rightfully authorizes the search of persons present on the prem-
ises; and second, the extent to which such a search may be
conducted.
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has had relatively little difficulty in conclud-
ing fourth amendment rights apply at the workplace as well as at
home.10 The problem is defining the extent of such rights. Logic and
common sense advise that places of business do not afford the same
degree of privacy that a home offers. "It is a fair generaliza-
tion. . .that business and commercial premises are not as private as
residential premises, and that consequently there are various police
procedures which may be directed at such premises without the po-
lice conduct constituting a Fourth Amendment search.""', This no-
tion that a person's fourth amendment rights relate to the locality
eventually led to several key Supreme Court decisions attempting to
clarify the idea.
A. Warrantless Searches
The 1967 decision in Katz v. United States12 led to more expan-
sive fourth amendment protections for the individual, regardless of
where he was located. The Court held that the "Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places."13 This pronouncement was, in effect, a
double-edged sword-what a person sought to keep private should
9. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
11. 1 W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.4(b), at 429 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp.
1988).
12. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (the Supreme Court held defendant was entitled to pri-
vacy while using a telephone booth, and that, because there was no warrant, the govern-
ment's eavesdropping activities violated the defendant's fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures, even though there had been no intrusion into
the booth).
13. Id. at 351.
remain so under the protection of the fourth amendment, yet what
that person exposed to the public would not be protected even if in
his home. 14 Thus, fourth amendment rights came to depend on the
more subjective test of a person's expectation of privacy, and not
merely upon that person's location.15
One year later, the Court had the opportunity to squarely address
the issue of privacy in the workplace. In Mancusi v. DeForte,'6 the
Supreme Court ruled that a union employee had standing to object
to the seizure of records belonging to the union, and that the war-
rantless search of his office was unconstitutional. In Mancusi, the
respondent, Mr. DeForte, was the vice president of Teamsters Union
Local 266. He was indicted on charges of conspiracy, coercion, and
extortion for using his office to compel owners of juke boxes to pay
"tribute. ' 17 Before the indictment was returned, the state issued a
subpoena duces tecum to the union office to produce certain books
and records. Respondent DeForte refused to comply. The state offi-
cials then searched his office, which he shared with other union offi-
cials, and seized the records. The search and seizure were conducted
without a warrant and over respondent's protest."
The Court, citing Katz, held that respondent DeForte's right to
assert the protection of the fourth amendment did not depend upon
property rights; 19 rather, it depended on whether the area searched
was one in which respondent maintained a reasonable expectation of
privacy.20 The only question left for the Court was whether the
search was reasonable. The Court noted that, with few exceptions, a
nonconsensual search of private property is per se unreasonable un-
less authorized by a search warrant.2' Since there was no valid
search warrant, the Court found the search unreasonable.22
14. Id.
15. See infra note 23.
16. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
17. Id. at 365 (here, "tribute" appears to be a euphemism for kickback).
18. Id.
19. In its decision, the Court held that "the word 'houses,' as it appears in the
[Fourth] Amendment, is not to be taken literally ... [and] the protection of the
Amendment may extend to commercial premises." Id. at 367; see also See v. Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
20. Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 368. In this respect, the Court did not find it dispositive
that the respondent shared his office:
It seems to us that the situation was not fundamentally changed because De-
Forte shared an office with other union officers. DeForte still could reasonably
have expected that only those persons and their personal or business guests
would enter the office, and that records would not be touched except with their
permission or that of union higher-ups.
Id. at 369.
21, See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (no warrant re-
quired for administrative, health, or welfare searches in emergencies).
22, In this case, the subpoena did not qualify as a valid search warrant because it
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Although not entirely subjective,23 the decision in Mancusi served
to reinforce the already inclusive standard of fourth amendment pro-
tection announced in Katz. Interestingly, in spite of the Court's proc-
lamation that "[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to know that
he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures, " 4 the
determination of whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy is by necessity framed in the context of the person's location.
The Court's language in these cases is strong, but it is important to
consider that in neither case were the police acting under the author-
ity of a valid search warrant.2 5
B. Warrant Searches
After the Supreme Court holdings in Katz and Mancusi, lower
courts seemed to have trouble determining the permissible scope of
search warrants. In 1973 the First Circuit Court of Appeals decided
United States v. Micheli 6 In Micheli, the court upheld a warrant
and admitted the evidence obtained by searching the appellant under
its authority, even though the warrant did not name him. The court
admitted the evidence on the basis of the appellant's relationship to
the place being searched.
In that case, the appellant and his brother co-owned the Hillside
Press, a business suspected of counterfeiting Federal Reserve Notes.
The United States Secret Service obtained a warrant to search the
office of the Hillside Press and a warrant to arrest the appellant's
brother. One-half hour after observing the appellant enter the prem-
ises with a brown briefcase, the agents arrested the appellant's
brother and searched the premises. During the search, the agents
discovered the brown briefcase under a table. On finding counterfeit
notes inside the briefcase, the agents arrested the appellant. At trial,
the appellant attempted to suppress the notes by claiming the agents
knew the briefcase was his personal property, and therefore it fell
was issued by the District Attorney, thus failing to meet the requirement that a search
warrant be issued by a neutral magistrate. Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 371.
23. Fourth amendment protection depends on whether the area being searched is
one in which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 368. (A "reasonable
expectation" is objective in that it must be an expectation that a reasonable person could
assert, and not simply any expectation of privacy claimed by the defendant. Nevertheless,
it is still a more subjective test than one that addresses only the physical fact of location.)
24. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
25. A warrantless search attracts much closer scrutiny because it is unreasonable
per se. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
26. 487 F.2d 429 (Ist Cir. 1973).
27. Id.
outside the permissible scope of the premises search the warrant au-
thorized.28 The district court denied the appellant's motion to
suppress.29
In permitting the personal belongings of an individual not named
in the warrant to be searched, the First Circuit stated: "[i]n so do-
ing, we do not mean to suggest that anything found on the premises
would necessarily fall within the scope of a warrant to search the
premises. Nor would we imply that the result would be different if
...appellant was physically holding the briefcase."30 The court
went on to suggest, however, that had the appellant been a doctor on
call, and had the agents known the briefcase belonged to him, the
result would have been different.31 The court acknowledged that a
warrant to search premises does not permit a personal search of one
who "merely happens to be present at the time," but proceeded to
formulate a method of distinguishing between the two situations.3 2
The court rejected the approach of some other jurisdictions, immu-
nizing any item in an individual's possession from search, as being
too narrow in scope. "The Fourth Amendment's basic interest in
protecting privacy and avoiding unreasonable governmental intru-
sions is hardly furthered by making its applicability hinge upon
whether the individual happens to be holding or wearing his personal
belongings after he chances into a place where a search is under-
way."33 Instead, the court based the search's validity on the relation-
ship between the person and the place searched. 4
Under this formulation, whatever is found on the premises is no
longer assumed to be "fair game." The court must examine why a
person's belongings are there.38 Although the court admitted that
this blurred rather than focused the rule, it did decide a search of a
person's clothing currently worn was "plainly within the ambit of a
personal search and outside the scope of a warrant to search the
premises. 36
The court's rationale was based not on the appellant's briefcase
being out of his reach at the time of the search, but on appellant
being the co-owner of the business.37 Searches of personal effects
were to be evaluated against the reasonable expectation of privacy
28. Id. at 430.
29. Id.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 431.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citations omitted).
34. Id. The Micheli court apparently declined to follow a rigid interpretation of
Katz by recognizing that the place may have some bearing on one's expectation of
privacy.
35. Id. at 432.
36. Id. at 431.
37. And "not in the position of a mere visitor." Id. at 432.
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the person brought to the premises, rather than assigning signifi-
cance to the premises themselves. The appellant's relationship to the
premises meant it was reasonable to expect some of his personal be-
longings would be there.3 8 The court concluded "the showing of
probable cause and necessity which was required prior to the initial
intrusion into his office reasonably comprehended within its scope
those personal articles, such as his briefcase, which might be lying
about the office.""9
This particular approach was not adopted universally. For exam-
ple, three years after Micheli, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia decided United States v. Branch. Branch involved a
narcotics arrest in which the police, acting under a warrant authoriz-
ing the daytime search of appellant Branch's apartment, discovered
quantities of cocaine and marijuana. Later that evening, while the
police were still searching, appellant Garrison arrived carrying a
shoulder bag. Although there was conflicting testimony as to
whether Garrison set the bag down or kept it in his possession, the
police searched the bag and discovered narcotics. Both appellants
were indicted for, and convicted of, possession with intent to dis-
tribute. Both parties appealed the trial court's denial of their sup-
pression motions.4
The appellate court reversed the trial court. 2 In discussing the
scope of the premises warrant, the court relied on two cases in which
exclusion of the evidence depended on whether the item searched
was in the physical possession of the defendant at the time of the
search. 3 While it did not expressly reject Micheli, it adopted the
holdings of the two cases stating: "while such personal items as the
shoulder bag under consideration may, in some circumstances, be
found to be within the ambit of a premises search warrant, we are
persuaded otherwise.""' In spite of this language, the court went on,
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 545 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
41. Id. at 178-81.
42. Id. at 186.
43. See Walker v. United States, 327 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (search of a
wallet and paper bag in defendant's hands held to be within the scope of a premises
search warrant); United States v. Teller, 397 F.2d 494 (7th Cir.)(search of a woman's
purse during a premises search upheld because the purse was found laying on a bed and
was not in the woman's possession), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 937 (1968).
44. Branch, 545 F.2d at 182 (emphasis added) (the court's reference is to the
holding in United States v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1973), in which the search
of a woman's purse, laying on the table in front of her, was held not to be a search of her
person).
using the very rationale it implied it was rejecting, to find that appel-
lant Garrison was "apparently a mere visitor; his relationship to the
premises was not known, but was at best the subject of specula-
tion." 4 The court concluded that under any test, the search of appel-
lant Garrison's shoulder bag was not authorized by the warrant.46
Micheli and Branch are representative of the inconsistent treat-
ment given to the permissible scope of premises search warrants.
Courts had moved from "constitutionally protected areas," before
Katz, to "reasonable expectations of privacy." When, and to what
extent, an individual present at the scene of a premises search could
be personally searched remained to be decided by the United States
Supreme Court.
III. YBARRA V. ILLINOIS
A. Facts
In Ybarra v. Illinois47 the Supreme Court acted to further refine
the doctrine of personal expectation of privacy established in Katz.
Illinois investigators, acting on an informant's tip that drugs were
being sold at the Aurora Tap Tavern, obtained a warrant to search
the premises and the person of the bartender. The warrant author-
ized the police to search for evidence of possession of heroin and
other narcotics. On entering the bar, the officers announced their in-
tent to search the patrons for weapons and proceeded to pat down
each of the customers. The officer who searched appellant Ybarra
felt what he thought was "a cigarette pack with objects in it," but he
did not remove it until he later returned to Ybarra. During the sec-
ond frisk the officer removed the cigarette pack, finding six tinfoil
packets inside which contained heroin. Ybarra was later indicted for
possession of a controlled substance.48
In response to Ybarra's suppression motion, the state relied on a
statute49 providing for such searches to "prevent the disposal or con-
cealment of [the] things particularly described in the warrant.
'50
The trial court denied Ybarra's motion. On appeal, the appellate
court found the statute was not unconstitutional, interpreting it to
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
48. Id. at 87-89.
49. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 108-09 (Smith-Hurd 1980) provides:
In the execution of the warrant the person executing the same may reasonably
detain to search any person in the place at the time:
(a) To protect himself from attack, or
(b) To prevent the disposal or concealment of any instruments, articles or
things particularly described in the warrant.
50. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 89.
[VOL. 26: 661, 1989] Premises Search Warrants
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
authorize searches of persons found at the bar only if there was
some relationship between the person and the bar.5 1 The appellate
court affirmed Ybarra's conviction because he was connected to the
bar, and not a mere stranger.52
B. The Majority Opinion
For its part, the Supreme Court framed Ybarra in the context of
probable cause-or rather the lack thereof. The majority began its
decision by noting that when the warrant issued, the police had no
reason to suspect Ybarra was breaking the law.53 Furthermore, the
Court stated, "[h]ad the issuing judge intended that the warrant
would or could authorize a search of every person found within the
tavern, he would hardly have specifically authorized the search of
[the bartender] alone."154 The Court also explained that Ybarra did
nothing during the search to give the police reason to suspect him.
His only "crime," in the eyes of the Court, was happening to be
present in the bar during the search. The majority made clear that
this was not sufficient reason to search him: "[A] person's mere pro-
pinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does
not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that per-
son. . . .Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure
of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with
respect to that person."55
True to form, the Court did not discuss constitutionally protected
areas, but referred, instead, to the patrons as being "clothed with
constitutional protection against an unreasonable search or an unrea-
sonable seizure. '5 6 While it was evident that this protection could
not be stripped away simply because the person was present at a
place of suspected criminal activity, the Court went on to state that
the individualized protection required for the patrons "was separate
and distinct from the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protection
possessed by the proprietor of the tavern or by [the bartender] .
'
5
Since the proprietor was not named in the warrant, it is unclear why
51. Id.
52. The appellate court found a connection in that the defendant was present in a
one-room bar where drugs were being sold, and was not an "innocent strange[r]." Id. at
89-90.
53. Id. at 90.
54. Id. at 90 n.2.
55. Id. at 91 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 91-92 (emphasis added).
the Court would distinguish him from the customers in that case."8
One possible explanation is that the Court implicitly recognized that
because the proprietor exercised some amount of control over the
premises, he had less of a reasonable expectation of privacy during a
warranted search of the bar than did the patrons. If this is so, the
decision in Ybarra leaves room for further refinement.59
C. Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Because the particular crime involved narcotics, 0 the focus of the
majority and of the dissent was on the requirement of probable cause
and on searches authorized by the Supreme Court's holding in Terry
v. Ohio.6 The majority limited the Terry exception, finding that
"[n]othing in Terry can be understood to allow a generalized 'cur-
sory search for weapons' or, indeed, any search whatever for any-
thing but weapons. 6 2 The dissent was not convinced that Terry
should be so narrowly construed.
Rehnquist said the true question was not whether the police are
entitled to conduct reasonable searches without a warrant, but
"whether and under what circumstances the police may search a
person present at the place named in the warrant."6 3 He allowed
that some searches-such as those expanding beyond the limits of
the warrant-were per se unreasonable.6 4 Ybarra, he claimed, did
not fall into this category because the fourth amendment does not
require that the warrant specify the persons to be searched, only the
places to be searched and what is to be seized.65 He noted the practi-
53. That is, aside from his independent fourth amendment interest against having
his property invaded.
59. In fact, the Court specifically deferred the question of whether the warrant
would authorize the search of unnamed persons in a place if it was supported by probable
cause to believe any person who would be in the place at the time of the search would be
in possession of illegal narcotics. Id. at 92 n.4. Of course, in so deferring, the Court did
not address the problem of searching employees other than the bartender.
60. Nearly all of the cases discussed so far have involved narcotics. This, perhaps,
is more a function of the times than a function of the law. There is no reason to suspect
the holdings in the cases cited depend on the type of crime being committed. Further-
more, Micheli involved a counterfeit operation rather than drugs. United States v.
Micheli, 487 F.2d 429, 430 (1st Cir. 1973). Therefore, the holdings should apply equally
well for other crimes.
61. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officers may conduct a reasonable pat down search for
weapons without probable cause if they have reason to believe the person is armed and
dangerous).
62. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93-94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 101.
64. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (police cannot seize one
thing under a warrant describing another thing).
65. Justice Rehnquist, quoting United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 155 n.15
(1974), stated: "The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to describe only 'the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,' not the persons from whom things
will be seized." Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 102 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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cal problems posed by requiring the police to specify all persons to
be searched in advance, and a particular problem with the majority
rule in Ybarra: it would permit "a person to frustrate the search
simply by placing the contraband in his pocket." 6
Rehnquist argued that, under some circumstances, authority to
search premises must include authority to search persons present
therein. He cited precedent6 7 that attempted to resolve the issue by
requiring the person searched have a "connection" with the prem-
ises, but noted that these and other attempts were somewhat lacking
in precision."' According to Justice Rehnquist, the "Court need look
no further than the first clause of [the Fourth] Amendment and need
ask no question other than whether, under all the circumstances, the
actions of the police in executing the warrant were reasonable."69
Justice Rehnquist thought the reasonableness test under a valid
warrant was different than that for warrantless searches. In cases
where the warrant requirement is satisfied, Rehnquist thought the
search should not be judged against the "jealously drawn exceptions
to that requirement.17 0 He stated that the majority's decision
threatened to restore the rigidity the Court previously rejected in
Terry.7 1 In addition, he thought the majority's opinion would make
the search warrant moot,72 since, if the police had probable cause to
believe the third parties possessed narcotics, they would need no war-
rant to conduct a body search. They could simply arrest that person
and conduct the search incident to the arrest. 3
Rehnquist concluded that the officer in Ybarra acted properly be-
cause he was acting under the authority of a valid search warrant
issued by a neutral magistrate. In his opinion, which seems to di-
verge from the holding in Katz, the premises warrant need only de-
scribe the place to be searched. Anyone present at the place would
then be subject to the search. 4
66. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 102 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67. See State v. Massie, 95 W. Va. 233, 120 S.E. 514 (1923); Purkey v. Maby,
33 Idaho 281, 193 P. 79 (1920).
68. Ybarra, 444 U.S at 103 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 104.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 105.
72. That is, moot as to the analysis of the permissibility of searching third parties
present. Of course, the warrant would still be required to authorize the search of the
physical premises.
73. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 104 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74. A more moderate view, previously articulated for the United States govern-
ment by Asst. U.S. Attorney Phillip L. B. Halpern, is that one's relationship to the prem-
ises can supply individualized probable cause.
D. Analysis of Ybarra
Ybarra now stands for the premise that police may not conduct
personal searches of the patrons of a business establishment unless
they can demonstrate a "particularized" probable cause to search
each patron. The decision was based on the patrons being mere visi-
tors. Accordingly, the police had no basis for suspicion other than
the patron's presence at a bar suspected of drug activity.7 5 A per-
son's mere presence at the scene of a premises search does not, by
itself, provide a sufficient basis to establish probable cause; therefore
the search was unreasonable. The visitors to a business establishment
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This expectation of privacy
was breached when the police frisked the visitors.
Actually, Ybarra provides no clear guidelines after all. The facts
in that case were extreme: the police conducted pat down searches of
people who, as far as the police knew, were simply visiting a bar.
Thus Ybarra did not address whether the police could have searched
the briefcases or purses of the patrons, even if they were not permit-
ted to search the patrons themselves, 6 or whether the police would
have been entitled to search someone who was more than a casual
visitor-such as an employee not named in the warrant.
Not surprisingly, lower courts still disagree about the permissible
scope of premises search warrants. Some focus on the relationship
between the person searched and the place for which the warrant
was issued. Others look to whether the item searched was in the pos-
session of the defendant.
IV. SCOPE OF PREMISES SEARCHES AFTER YBARRA
A. Persons Subject to Business Searches
1. Visitors
No cases involving business visitors have come after Ybarra. How-
ever, it is clear that visitors to residences are accorded Ybarra pro-
tection. In United States v. Neet," a federal district court for Colo-
rado upheld the search of one visitor to a house suspected of
harboring drug activity, yet disallowed the search of another visitor
present at the same house during the same search.7 8 In Neet, local
police and United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents
75. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 90-92.
76. Although, given the decision in Ybarra, there is no reason to suspect the po-
lice would be entitled to do so, since such a search would still amount to an invasion of
the customer's privacy.
77. 504 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Colo. 1981); see also United States v. Robertson, 833
F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1987) (search of a visitor's backpack not justified by warrant to
search the premises).
78. Neet, 504 F. Supp. at 1228.
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arranged a buy from defendant Neet. Neet told the agents he was to
meet later with his supplier to obtain additional cocaine. Some
agents followed Neet to his supplier's home where they set up sur-
veillance. Some time later, the agents observed defendant Van Omen
enter the house carrying a briefcase. Approximately thirty minutes
later, Neet left the residence. After another thirty minutes, the
agents observed defendant Mary Miller enter the house. The agents
then went to the front door and identified themselves. At this point
they saw Van Omen nod his head toward a door which then closed.
The agents entered the premises to prevent destruction of the evi-
dence. During this time the agents requested and received a search
warrant authorizing a search of the premises and "all persons" lo-
cated there. Once the warrant was obtained, the agents conducted a
search of the premises, eventually discovering narcotics in Miller's
purse and large amounts of money in Van Omen's briefcase.79
Among the issues presented to the district court was whether the
evidence seized from the briefcase and the purse should be admitted.
The court found that the warrant was overbroad because it author-
ized the search of all persons on the premises, when the officer's affi-
davit related only to white males. Thus, the affidavit did not give the
issuing judge probable cause to permit a search of Miller, a female.80
For this reason, the court had to look to the scope of that part of the
warrant permitting a search of the premises.
In analyzing the scope of a premises warrant, the court acknowl-
edged the prior decisions in Walker and Teller, but relied primarily
on the rationale set forth in Micheli.8 ' The court noted that neither
the briefcase nor the purse were in the possession of their owners,
but also indicated that "mere physical possession is not the sole cri-
terion which should determine whether a personal item may be
searched pursuant to a premises search warrant." ' 2 In addition, the
court intimated that "there may be situations where a 'mere visitor'
may find his or her personal belongings subjected to a search of the
premises despite the fact that he or she has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in those belongings ... .
Having laid this framework, however, the court proceeded to dis-
tinguish between the evidence seized from the briefcase, and that
79. Id. at 1222-24.
80. Id. at 1226.
81. Id. at 1228.
82. Id.
83. Id.
seized from Miller's purse. The court concluded that Van Omen
could not maintain a legitimate expectation of privacy for his brief-
case because he was not a "mere visitor." The officers had seen him
enter the house at a time when defendant Neet expected to receive
cocaine for delivery. Van Omen was further tied to the transaction
by his nod to the defendant attempting to destroy the evidence. Ac-
cordingly, the court found that the warrant to search the house "also
reasonably encompassed a search of the briefcase carried into the
house by the defendant Van Omen."8
Miller, though, stood on different ground. The court stated that in
her case; the police had no way of knowing who she was or what
relationship, if any, she bore to the premises. Miller did not arrive at
the house when defendant Neet was present; therefore there was no
"inference . . . that she could be involved as a courier.""5 This lack
of relationship meant the search of her purse was without
authority.86
For defendant Miller, the analysis is much the same as in Ybarra.
The police had no probable cause to suspect her of being involved in
the narcotics transaction, therefore any search of her, or her purse,
would be unreasonable. As a "mere visitor," she was entitled to a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Her privacy was then breached
when the police searched her purse.8 7
It is worth noting the court began its analysis in terms of probable
cause, and concluded by examining the relationship between the per-
son and the premises. When one party, Van Omen, had an identifi-
able relationship to the premises searched, the permissible scope of
the warrant encompassed him; but when the other party had no such
relationship, she was outside the permissible scope of the warrant.
Since the scope of a warrant is necessarily determined by probable
cause, a natural inference is that probable cause is logically con-
nected to a person's relationship to the place being searched. Fur-
thermore, the analysis in this case implies that, for the purposes of
probable cause based on that relationship, the relationship must be
one identifiable by the police at the time of the search.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1228, 1229.
87. Defendant Van Omen was treated differently because the court found he was
related to the drug transaction by virtue of the timing of his arrival and his subsequent
actions while in the residence. This relationship to the premises served to extend the
probable cause to encompass Van Omen and his briefcase. Accordingly, Van Omen's
expectation of privacy was not an issue.
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2. Owners of a Business
Ybarra represented one extreme: a search of persons visiting a bar
and having no apparent relation to the bar other than patronage.
Other decisions, based on Micheli, have permitted searches when the
scene of the search has been the workplace. 8
Most recently, in United States v. McLaughlin,89 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that the permissible scope of a
premises search warrant encompassed the briefcase of the co-owner
of the business for which the warrant was issued. 0 In that case, po-
lice obtained warrants to search McLaughlin's apartment and Bath-
crest, a business owned by McLaughlin and his friend, Bernauer.
While searching Bathcrest, the police found cocaine in Bernauer's
briefcase. After indictment for possession of narcotics, both appel-
lants moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search on
the grounds of lack of probable cause, and the search of Bernauer's
briefcase exceeded the permissible scope of the premises warrant.
The trial court denied these motions, and convicted both
appellants.91
In his appeal, appellant Bernauer relied on Ybarra, arguing, in
effect, that his mere proximity to McLaughlin did not give rise to
probable cause. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, relying on
Micheli9 2 The court distinguished Ybarra, stating "[c] o-owners have
control over premises not available to patrons, and their relationship
to the location is more predictable and permanent."93
The appellants then attempted to distinguish their situation from
that in Micheli by noting that the business in Micheli was believed
to be a criminal enterprise, where in their case the business was le-
gitimate. The court rejected this distinction, stating that the warrant
was issued on the assumption that evidence of criminal activity
would be found at Bathcrest, and since "Bernauer was co-owner of
Bathcrest and had control over the location, the entire location was
subject to search even though police had no probable cause to sus-
88. See Chester v. State, 162 Ga. App. 10, 290 S.E.2d 117 (1982) (warrant for
premises included suitcase located in the defendant's office, even though the defendant
was not named in the warrant).
89. 851 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1988).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 284.
92. Id. at 287.
93. The court added, however, that "Micheli need not extend to guests. Its rule
seems reasonably applicable to owners." Id.
pect Bernauer. ' 4
Here, the police had no probable cause at the outset to name
Bernauer in the warrant. However, because he was a co-owner of
Bathcrest, Bernauer's expectation of privacy apparently was less
than that of a visitor. The relationship, in effect, imputed the proba-
ble cause needed to search Bernauer's briefcase. Once the court
found the necessary probable cause existed, the search of the brief-
case no longer constituted an unreasonable infringement of
Bernauer's privacy.
The result of this case represents, perhaps, the farthest departure
yet from Ybarra, which was thought to be a limiting decision. How-
ever, the two cases can be reconciled if one examines them in the
context of probable cause being a function of the relationship be-
tween the person and the place searched.
3. Analysis-Who can be Searched?
As has been demonstrated, case law is neither clear nor consistent
in this area. Furthermore, while it addresses the extreme situations
of visitors and owners, there are no cases directly addressing em-
ployee searches pursuant to a premises search warrant.95 Still, some
determination can be made as to whether a valid search warrant au-
thorizing the search of corporate premises encompasses the search of
its employees, and, if so, to what extent.
The idea articulated in Micheli was that a person's expectation of
privacy depends not on where he is-a theory rejected by Katz-but
on his or her relationship to that place. In the words of the court: "A
visitor in a private home stands in a different position from an ha-
bitue of a 'shooting gallery.' "9'
The Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged this in Ybarra when
it framed its ruling in terms of the appellant's lack of relation to the
bar. The warrant did not mention the patrons of the bar; therefore
the police had no probable cause to search the patrons. The Court
required something more than mere presence to establish probable
94. Id.; see also United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1985) (warrant
to search entire premises not overbroad because the entire premises were suspect and the
defendant exercised dominion and control over the entire premises).
95. Although one Ninth Circuit decision upheld the search of an office and em-
ployees, the decision was strictly limited to whether the search was void in its entirety,
and not whether the search of the employees was valid. See United States v. Offices
Known as 50 State Distrib. Co., 708 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1021 (1984).
96. United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429, 432 (lst Cir. 1973). A possible un-
stated rationale behind this statement is that although the place is not a controlling
factor in assessing the expectation of privacy, it is a factor nonetheless. This is consistent
with the court's "relationship" test, because in order to ascribe some meaning to a per-
son's relationship to a place, there must first be some significance to the place itself.
97. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 90.
[VOL. 26: 661, 1989] Premises Search Warrants
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
cause to search. 98 However, while the Court noted "a warrant to
search a place cannot normally be construed to authorize a search of
each individual in that place," it did not rule out the possibility of a
search of unnamed persons based on probable cause to believe that
"persons who will be in the place at the time of the search will be in
possession of illegal drugs." 99 Furthermore, it must be remembered
that Ybarra involved the personal search of someone who was no
more than a visitor to a bar.
Nor has the relationship test lost any of its vitality after Ybarra.
The holdings in Neet, and most recently in McLaughlin, are evi-
dence that courts since Micheli continue to examine the individual's
relationship to the premises. The next question, then, is this: Assum-
ing one's relationship to the premises searched may determine one's
expectation of privacy, how close a relationship would be required to
impute probable cause?
Ybarra served to set a lower limit: in order to be searched, one
must be more than a mere visitor to the premises. Cases like Micheli
and McLaughlin show probable cause may be imputed when the
person being searched is the owner or co-owner of the business to be
searched. The area in between, however, is undecided. As the
Micheli court commented, "[b]etween the extremities, no crisp
formula can substitute for reasonable judgments."' 00 Language
found in McLaughlin may prove useful in making reasonable judg-
ments. In McLaughlin, the court determined there are two factors to
be examined. The first was the owner's control over the premises.
The second was that the owner's relationship to the premises was
more "predictable and permanent."'' 1
Applying these rules to a corporate search, the question, according
to McLaughlin, would be whether an employee is closer to an owner
or closer to a patron. While an employee has less control over the
premises than an employer or an owner of the business, the employee
could still be expected to exercise a greater degree of control over his
or her workspace than a mere visitor.
As to the second factor, the employee's relationship to the prem-
ises seems more "predictable and permanent" than a visitor's. How-
ever, even here there is room for question. What, for example, about
a temporary employee of the corporation, or an independent contrac-
98. Id. at 91.
99. Id. at 92 n.4. (emphasis added).
100. Micheli, 487 F.2d at 432.
101. United States v. McLaughlin, 851 F.2d 283, 287 (9th Cir. 1988).
tor? What guidelines are the police to follow in these cases? Al-
though these situations would undoubtedly stretch the definition of
"relationship," searches have been upheld on the basis of much more
tenuous connections than these.
The court in Neet, for instance, was willing to uphold the search
of Van Omen's briefcase because he was apparently connected with
the drug deal. This was determined by virtue of the timing of Van
Omen's arrival, and his nodding to a codefendant, signaling him to
destroy the evidence. 1 2 These facts alone were enough to show the
police that Van Omen was not a "total stranger" to the premises.0 3
Under this standard, even temporary employees and independent
contractors could be included within the search if they exercised
some control over the areas being searched. Such a standard calls for
discretion on the part of the police to be able to determine who,
among those present at a search, is an employee; this is no different
than the current requirement that the police be able to discern who
are "mere visitors. 10 4
The problem, of course, is that employees-even temporary em-
ployees-are entitled to be free from unreasonable invasions of their
privacy in the workplace. This expectation must be balanced against
the public's increasing interest in pursuing white collar crime. In or-
der to effectively prosecute corporate offenders, the police must be
able to search for evidence in those places where they have probable
cause to believe it will be found. As previously mentioned, because
the documents are not actually controlled by the "corporation," but
by the individuals that comprise the corporation, it is possible that
any number of employees may exercise control over the documents
or records containing the evidence sought. Therefore, the search
should not be barred because the police failed to anticipate who,
among the employees, held the evidence. To the extent employees
bear an identifiable relationship to the premises being searched, this
relationship should serve as the "particularized" probable cause re-
quired by Ybarra. If so, searches of employees should not be consid-
ered unreasonable infringements on their expectations of privacy.
Thus, presuming police establish probable cause to believe evi-
dence of a crime may be found on corporate premises, and further
assuming they have reason to believe some of the employees are in
possession of this evidence, a warrant for the search of the premises
102. United States v. Neet, 504 F. Supp. 1220, 1228 (D. Colo. 1981).
103. Id. In another case, a federal court held that a premises search warrant
authorized the search of defendants' pocketbooks and briefcase because they had spent
"at least one night" at the premises being searched and were therefore "not mere pas-
serbys [sic]." United States v. Hilton, 469 F. Supp. 94, 111 (N.D. Me. 1979).
104. In fact, the use of employee rosters and pay records could serve both to
facilitate the search and to protect the rights of any nonemployees present during the
search, by clearly identifying the employees of the corporation.
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should be found to encompass a search of the employees.
B. Scope of Business Searches
Assuming that we know who may be searched, the next question
is: To what extent may the search be conducted? In any search,
there are competing interests that define the limits of the search.
Generally, a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate is the result of
balancing these competing interests; the public's interest in prosecut-
ing criminal conduct is weighed against the individual's interest in
being free from intrusive searches. Thus, police must demonstrate
they have probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity
will be found at the premises. The warrant limits where the police
may search and what may be seized. However, it is possible that
even if the police are reasonable in where they search, the search
may become unreasonable because of the manner in which it is con-
ducted. Too aggressive a search will surely be unreasonable and
therefore void.
105
1. Pat Down Searches
In Terry v. Ohio,106 the Supreme Court held that police are enti-
tled to conduct a limited search of a person's outer clothing if they
reasonably believe the person is armed and dangerous. This excep-
tion to the warrant requirement, however, was not easily extended.
The Court found the governmental interest in preventing crime,
combined with the more significant interest of protecting officers and
others from immediate harm, outweighed the individual's interest in
being free from intrusive searches. It stated, however, that "[e]ven a
limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe,
though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must
surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experi-
ence."' 7 By such language, the Court made clear that personal
searches of this nature require substantial justification. It is no won-
der, then, the Court reacted the way it did in Ybarra, when the po-
lice could not show they had reason to believe the patrons were
armed.
The search in Ybarra was clearly "personal." The police searched
105. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (obtaining evidence by forc-
ing the defendant to vomit violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
106. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
107. Id. at 24, 25.
the pockets and clothing of each patron. Significantly, the Micheli
court would probably have ruled in the same manner as the Supreme
Court did in Ybarra. In examining the nature of a personal search,
the court in Micheli carefully pointed out that "[a] search of cloth-
ing currently worn is plainly. . .outside the scope of a warrant to
search the premises."' 10 8 This is consistent with Ybarra's holding to
the extent physical searches-pat downs or frisk searches-of third
parties would not be authorized under a premises search warrant.
There is no authority, then, for the proposition that police may
frisk or pat down persons pursuant to a premises search warrant.
Because of the "severe" nature of a pat down search, Terry and
Ybarra'09 limit it to only those situations in which police have reason
to believe the person being searched is armed. Therefore, in the con-
text of a corporate search, police should not be entitled to pat down
anyone present unless they have reason to believe that person is
armed.110
2. Personal Belongings
The question of searching personal belongings is not as clearly de-
fined as the question of permissible pat down searches. Depending
upon the jurisdiction, the validity of the search may turn on the type
of belonging being searched; whether the belonging was in the physi-
cal possession of the owner at the time of the search; or whether the
belonging was locked.
The type of belonging may become important during a corporate
search because the police must still have probable cause to believe
that the evidence may be found in that type of belonging. The ques-
tion is one of intensity. Can the police search only those items in
which the evidence would probably be found, or may they search
those items in which the evidence could be found? In one case, for
example, a court ruled against searching a woman's purse when po-
lice were looking for business records."' The weight of authority,
however, seems to support the proposition that police may search
those containers in which the evidence might be found." 2 In addi-
108. United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429, 431 (1st Cir. 1973).
109. See also United States v. Sporleder, 635 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1980) (pat
down search of defendant not authorized by premises search warrant).
110. It may be argued that such a limitation would allow someone to defeat the
search merely by putting a document or computer disk inside her coat pocket. While this
is no doubt true, it must be remembered that searches are limited by the judicial balance
of the government's interests against those of the individual. Here, the balance tips in
favor of the individual when the search intrudes upon her physical person.
111. See State v. Scott, 21 Wash. App. 113, 584 P.2d 423 (1978).
112. For a summary of cases illustrating this proposition, see Burkoff, Search
Warrant Execution: Scope and Intensity, 13 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP., Apr. 1986, at
25, 29.
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tion, the Supreme Court has held that "a warrant that authorizes an
officer to search a home for illegal weapons also provides authority to
open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon
might be found.""' 3
In a search for documents, it makes little sense to say police are
authorized to intrude on an employee's privacy by searching his or
her briefcase, but are not authorized to search the same employee's
purse or athletic bag. Once the threshold question of probable cause
has been resolved in favor of permitting the search, the police should
be allowed to search any personal containers in which the document
could be found.
Although some courts" 4 still bar searches of belongings when they
are in the physical possession of the owner, the better view has been
expressed in Micheli. The validity of the search should not rest on
whether a person's briefcase was on a desk or in the person's
hand,"15 but on whether that person's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy precluded a search at all. If there is no relationship to the
premises, the belonging should not be searched at all, whether or not
it was in the owner's immediate possession. On the other hand, if
such a relationship does exist, the police can search the belonging. 1 6
Finally, there is the question of belongings, such as briefcases, that
may be locked during the time of the search. By locking a briefcase,
the owner takes an extra step to ensure his or her privacy in the
workplace. In doing so, that person is manifesting a higher expecta-
tion of privacy than in leaving the briefcase unlocked. The rationale
in Micheli hints that the higher expectation of privacy displayed by
keeping a container locked might be sufficient to defeat the premises
search warrant. Closer examination, however, shows the Micheli
113. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821 (1982) (emphasis added).
114. The Robertson court, for example, ruled against a search both because the
defendant was a visitor to the premises and because the search of the backpack--"a
container so closely associated with one's person"--should have been supported by a war-
rant which satisfied the particularity requirement. United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d
777, 784 (9th Cir. 1987).
115. Otherwise, the search could be defeated simply by taking the briefcase in
hand.
116. In permitting the appellant's briefcase to be searched, the Micheli court rea-
soned that, because of the appellant's "special relationship" to the premises:
[I]t could reasonably be expected that some of his personal belongings would
be there. Thus the showing of probable cause and necessity which was required
prior to the initial intrusion into his office reasonably comprehended within its
scope those personal articles, such as his briefcase, which might be lying about
the office.
United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429, 432 (1st Cir. 1973).
court was addressing the privacy rights of a mere visitor rather than
someone who belonged at the place being searched: "A different sit-
uation exists when a personal effect is so secreted that police could
reasonably assume that the visitor did not harbor a normal expecta-
tion of privacy but, indeed, took extraordinary measures to insure
that the effect would be hidden from view.""1
7
Post-Micheli case law supports the idea that a search authorized
by warrant may authorize the opening of locked containers., 8 Once
the individual's privacy interest has been overcome by the search
warrant, the fact that the container is locked seems inconsequential.
Indeed, if the search is to be conducted with any efficiency, this must
be the rule. Giving the police the authority to search an employee's
belongings would be meaningless if the authority could be defeated
merely by locking the belonging." 9 Consequently, assuming the em-
ployee's relationship to the premises provides probable cause to
search that employee's belongings, the permissible scope of the
search should extend to the employee's locked belongings.
V. CONCLUSION
What, then, happened to Ybarra? The answer depends on how
that case is construed. If, as some say, Ybarra held that people not
named in a search warrant cannot be searched, 120 then there has
been an identifiable contraction of that holding. On the other hand,
if Ybarra is limited to its facts, subsequent decisions have not under-
mined it.
121
What happened is that, in an attempt to further refine the ruling
in Katz, some courts adopted the Micheli test-that of the relation-
117. Id. at 432 n.2 (emphasis added). This also raises the question of whether the
Micheli court would consider locking a briefcase an "extraordinary measure."
118. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649 (9th Cir.) (upholding a
search in which police cut open defendant's locked briefcase), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 977
(1984); United States v. Morris, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1981) (search warrant for home
authorized opening of a locked jewelry case in which the items being sought might have
been found); State v. Thisius, 281 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 1978) (police executing a warrant
to search a residence not required to obtain a second warrant to open a locked box that
might have contained the items described in the warrant). But cf. State v. Starke, 81
Wis. 2d 399, 260 N.W.2d 739 (1978) (excessively broad search warrant did not permit
search of defendant's locked file cabinet).
119. Here, unlike the hypothetical in which the employee attempts to evade the
search by placing the document in his or her pocket, the physical act of locking a brief-
case is likely to go undetected. If the employee were to take the document and hide it on
his person, the physical act is more likely to be noticed and may, if seen by an officer,
give rise to probable cause to search the employee.
120. See, e.g., Comment, Fourth Amendment Rights of Persons Present When a
Search Warrant is Executed: Ybarra v. Illinois, 66 IOWA L. REv. 453 (1981); Note,
Criminal Law-Search of Persons Present on Premises Subject to a Search War-
rant-Ybarra v. Illinois, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 512 (1980).
121. The question is raised as to how the current Court would construe Ybarra.
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ship of the person to the place being searched. This test is consistent
with both Katz and Ybarra, and offers a great degree of flexibility in
determining the validity of searches.
Under this test,122 if an individual has an identifiable relationship
to the premises being searched, this relationship may supply the
probable cause necessary to search that individual. Therefore, be-
cause an employee has an identifiable relationship to a corporation, a
search of the employee is authorized by a warrant authorizing a
search of the corporation.
However, the permissible scope of this search is limited. While the
employee's expectation of privacy may be somewhat reduced because
of his relationship to the premises, even the Micheli court would pro-
tect the employee from search of his or her physical person. Thus,
during a premises search the police may search the employee's brief-
case or purse, but they may not bodily search the employee.
JEFFREY D. WINTER
122. This view of the permissible scope of a premises search warrant is more
moderate than that Justice Rehnquist proposes. He would uphold a search like the one in
Ybarra so long as the warrant properly described the premises to be searched. Under the
test proposed by this Comment, third parties may be searched only if they have some
relation to the premises, and even then the search would be limited to their belongings.

